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Since the beginning of the exploration of the cosmic space, about 
twenty years ago, a vast mass of new material has come to be absorbed 
by international law. During the lapse of a few years, mostly in response 
to resolutions passed in the General Assembly of the United Nations, 
some fundamental rules of customary law relating to space have become 
firmly established. What is perhaps most characteristic of the rapid devel­
opment is that scarcely nine years after the first satellite had been launch- 
ed, on the 27th January, 1967 the Treaty on Principles Governing the 
Activities of States in the Exploration anci Use of Outer Space including 
t he Moon and ot her Celestial Bodies was opened for signature
This Treaty consolidated and set forth in greater detail the customary 
rules at that time already established or in statu nascendi. The Treaty is of 
particular significance because in it principles of general validity have been 
laid down which have to be considered normative for all kinds of activi­
ties jn  outer space. Other conventions following upon the basic Treaty of 
196/ substantially set forth the rules and principles laid down in the Space 
Treaty in vet greater detail so as to eliminate or at least mitigate any diffi­
culties that might arise in the application of the provisions of the basic 
Treaty. It was on this understanding that the Agreement on the Rescue 
of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects 
Launched into Outer Space, the Convention on International Liability for 
Damage Caused by Space Objects and the Convention on the Registration 
of Objects Launched into Outer Space were born.
'fhe Treaty of 1967, however, failed to tackle questions of a general 
nature apt to arise in connexion with activities in outer space in their en­
tirety, the less could it attempt to formulate concrete rules to govern the 
practical application of certain achievements of space technology. This 
shortcoming of the Treaty is wholly understandable: in fact the drafters of 
the Treaty had above all to provide for the legal framework absolutely 
essential for the exploration of outer space. Now, however, that by the side 
of exploratory work beginnings have been made with the exploitation of 
space technology for practical ends the need has come to the fore, first, 
for the legal regulation of still unsettled problems of a general kinci, and!
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secondly, for the legal regulation of certain concrete practical ways of 
application of space technology.
Of the questions of a general nature two have already turned up in the 
General Assembly of the United Nations, and pursuant to several resolu­
tions of the General Assembly have already been submitted to the Legal 
Sub-Committee of the UN organ entrusted with the international legal 
regulation of space activities, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space, now composed of 47 members. One of these questions may seem to be 
the preliminary question or even precondition of regulation under interna­
tional law, whereas the second appeared as justified by the fact that space 
objects launched by the Soviet Union and the United States have already 
reached the Moon, moreover the United States has even landed astronauts 
on this celestial body. The first question relates to the delimitation of the 
outer space as opposed to air-space, the second deals with the definition 
of the legal status of the Moon and possibly other celestial bodies.
The first question is closely associated with the Treaty of 1967. This 
Treaty has exactly been meant to bring under regulation the fundamental 
problems relating to outer space. I t stands to reason, therefore, that above 
all the territorial confines have to be established whence the provisions 
of the basic treaty become applicable, i. e. the confines in space where the 
air-space under the sovereignty of states ends and cosmic space begins, 
which in conformity with Article II of the Treaty ’is not subject to national 
appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or 
by any other means’. It is by no means accidental that the French jurists 
brought up on Cartesian logic are the protagonists of the conception accord­
ing to which the delimitation of air-space and the cosmic space has to be 
regarded as the cardinal issue of space law, and therefore in the opinion of 
the partisans of this conception priority has to be granted to it above any 
other question. In the UN Legal Sub-Committee it is the French delegation 
which as a rule takes the most definite stand for the settlement of this issue.
As is known in the literature of international law a number of theories 
have already been advanced for the establishment of the considerations 
which according to the initiators and propagators of these theories could 
be resorted to with success for the delimitation of outer space. At the same 
time it is obvious that in this initial phase of the practical application of 
space technology there is a large number of states which refuse to align 
themselves to the one or the other theory since the possible future conse­
quences of such an alignment cannot be foreseen.
A lay onlooker might be tempted to believe that some sort of anarchy 
seems to prevail in cosmic space and that owing to the large number of 
objects launched into space ‘frontier disputes’ are the order of the day. 
Fortunately such anxieties are unfounded and apart from an invented dis­
pute to be discussed below, the uncertainty of the frontier line for the time 
being does not in the least obstruct the peaceful exploration and use of the 
outer space.
The UN Legal Sub-Committee, which in its annually convened four- 
week sessions devotes an hour or two at most to this seemingly unsolvablo
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problem, in its position has set out from the understanding that in the pres­
ent situation only such activities should be brought under regulation as 
the states or certain international organizations perform in outer space 
and as cannot be performed elsewhere. If activities of this kind shall come 
up for legal regulation, then as space technology stands at present the issue 
of delimitation cannot be considered such of primary importance. In fact so 
far the states have agreed that the space objects launched are already at 
their perigee, i.e. the point at which the objects in their orbit are nearest 
the earth, outside the air-space under the sovereignty of states.
Recently a certain phenomenon has evoked in many the anxiety wheth­
er the uncertainty of the upper limit of the air space might not tempt to 
bringing forward claims very much the same as have been laid by certain 
states as regards the territorial sea, a question which the Geneva conven­
tions of 1958 failed to define so as to preclude any doubts as to its maximum 
extension.1 Without any exaggeration the statement may be made that 
one of the causes of the collapse of the system called to life by the Geneva 
conventions on the law of the sea was the claim laid by a number of coun­
tries to the extension of the territorial sea to 200 miles. Recently wo mav 
witness the phenomenon that the equatorial states lay claim to the extension 
of their sovereignty to what is called the geostationarv orbit, which mav 
be drawn at a height of about 35 800 kilometres above the Equator. The 
geostationary orbit, which permits the artificial satellites placed on it to 
stay during their revolutions above the same point of the earth, lends itself 
in particular readily for the operation of artificial satellites serving the ends 
of radio and television broadcasts and meteorological observations, and 
even for other tasks. Still the number of objects that can be accomodated in 
this orbit is limited. The states through whose territory the Equator runs 
would, of course, like to exploit the advantages this orbit offers for their 
benefit, and therefore in the 1977 Geneva world conference of the Inter­
national Telecommunication Union the majority of these states, i. e. eight 
equatorial states declared their intention to make good their claims to the 
geostationary orbit, which they regarded as constituting part of their nat- 
uial resources. these states laid down their claims partlv in declarations 
attached to the binai Acts of the conference, partlv- in other documents 
submitted to the Conference.2
f  ^ A large number of states attending the Conference of the International 
Telecommunication Union decidedly rejected this claim of the equatorial 
states. In the Conference the majority of the socialist countries, among 
them the Hungarian People’s Republic, in a declaration made at the sig­
nature of the Final Acts of the Conference,3 referring to declarations made 
by certain states in connexion with the geostationary orbit made it clear 
that the resolutions of the Conference relating to the use of the geostation- 
arv orbit weie in complete agreement with the generally accepted princi­
ples and iules of international law hereincluded the International Tele­
communication Convention and the pertinent Regulations. In another 
declaration1 the socialist states reserved the right to institute the necessary 
measures for the proper operation of their telecommunication services
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should the one or the other country fail to observe the resolutions passed 
by the Conference. A number of capitalist states, too, made statements 
objecting to the position the equatorial states had taken, however, in their 
argumentations they merely stated that issues regarding the geostationary 
orbit did not appear on the agenda of the Conference and therefore, these 
could not come up for discussion, moreover t he discussion of this issue close­
ly associated with the question of the delimitation of space came within 
the competence of the Space Committee of the United Nations, or still bet­
ter, within that of its two sub-committees.
Obviously this argumentation, too, encouraged the equatorial states 
to raise the issue of the geostationary orbit in the 16th session of the Legal 
Sub-Committee of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
held in New York, in 1977.5 Still at that time the issue had not been dis­
cussed in its substance in the Sub-Committee. On the other hand the issue 
had been taken up on the agenda of tlie 17th session of the Sub-Committee 
held in Geneva, in 1978, and came up for discussion there.
Which are the reasons brought forward by the equatorial states to 
substantiate their claims to sovereignty over the geostationary orbit? The 
declaration signed by the eight states referred to6 in Bogota on the 3rd 
December, 1976, before the opening of the conference of tlie International 
Telecommunication Union sets out from the statement that the existence 
of the geostationary orbit is closely associated with gravitational phenom­
ena and cannot, therefore, be considered part of the outer space. Conse­
quently the particular sections of the orbit constitute part of the territory 
under the sovereignty of the equatorial states and qualify as natural re­
sources of which the given states dispose. According to this declaration the 
provisions of the 1967 Space Treaty cannot affect t he rights of the equatorial 
states also because the delimitation of outer space has not as yet taken 
place, and so arguments brought forward to the effect that the geostation­
ary orbit is part of outer space cannot hold their own. All that has so far be­
come established in practice is but the „technological partition“of the orbit, 
an act which amounts to the „national appropriation“ of the orbit, i.e. 
something the equatorial states have to denounce. In the separate instru­
ments submitted to the Conference, so in particular in the Indonesian 
document, there is express reference to the law of the sea on the analogy 
of which state sovereignty has developed in outer space. Moreover mention 
has been made of the theory of the infinite vertical extension of state sov­
ereignty, i.e. of sovereignty usque ad caelum.
At the present stage of development of international space law this 
argumentation can be refuted without difficulty. Although the 1967 Treaty 
does not establish the lower limits of cosmic space, still it clearly and decid­
edly states -  as already indicated -  in Article II the thesis that ‘Outer 
space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to nation­
al appropriation by d a  m to sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, 
or by any other means.’ Nor can it be called into doubt that the geostation­
ary orbit at a height of nearly 36 000 kilometers is veritably part of the 
cosmic space. As a matter of fact the apogee of many an artificial satellite
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running their courses is far below this height. If the lower limits of outer 
space can become a matter of dispute at all. so any dispute will have to 
concentrate on whether this limit should be at a height of 80. 90 or perhaps 
130 kilometers.7 It is a commonly known fact that the perigee of a large 
number of space objects is somewhere at these heights, and. as has already 
been told, so far no country has objected to space activities at these heights 
on the plea that the penetration of space objects to this part of space has 
violated its sovereignty. Consequently the states concerned regarded this 
space as the part of outer space. Whether or not the geostationary orbit is 
in the one way or the other associated with terrestrial gravitation is meaning­
less for the purpose of the establishment of its legal status. Once the orbit 
is situated in the cosmic space, it will obviously share the legal fate of this 
space irrespective of to what its physical properties may be attributed. 
If on the other hand for its peculiarities and for the fact that its properties 
can be exploited by a limited number of space objects only the geostation­
ary orbit is considered a natural resource, this circumstance can in no way 
be construed so as to confer a privileged position on the states situated 
below at a distance of about 36000 kilometers, with respect to other states. 
If this were the case, we should obviously come into conflict with the 
provisions of the standard treaty relating to outer space referred to above, 
which are normative also for the natural resources of outer space.8
The question may now be asked as to tlie position of the equatorial 
states which have not become parties to the 1967 Treaty. Although the 
Treaty has met with considerable response on the part of the states, and 
until the beginning of 1977 92 states have become parties to it, which is a 
fairly large number when compared to that of the signatories to other im­
portant multilateral treaties and conventions, nevertheless more than a 
third of the community of states has failed to sign it. Among these is 
Colombia, whose observer in the session of the Legal Sub-Committee did 
not fail to point out that the Treaty was not binding on his country.
In our opinion in the given instance it is meaningless whether or not 
a state has become party to the 1967 Treaty. Namely if any of the provisions 
of a treaty is uniform with an established general rule of international 
customary law, then as a matter of course the same obligations are binding 
on the signatories as well as non-signatories. As the International Court of 
Justice has in its judgements in the disputes between the Federal Republic 
of Germany and Denmark and then between the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the Netherlands on the continental shelf of the North Sea 
established, a situation just referred to may arise in two ways. It is possible 
that the treaty merely declares an already established rule of customary 
law, still it may also occur that the practice developed bv the states ab­
staining from the treaty in reaction to the provisions of this treaty and as 
for the content uniform with them will give birth to a general rule of cus­
tomary law.9
The General Assembly of the United Nations laid down the principle 
of the free use of outer space long before the approval of the standard 
treaty in several resolutions, of which we would refer to the most important
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only, namely to Resolution 1962 (XVIII), entitled ‘Declaration of Legal 
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use 
of Outer Space’ In para. 2 tliis resolution unanimously approved and called 
a Declaration states: “Outer space and celestial bodies are free for explora­
tion and use by all States on a basis of equality and in accordance with 
international law.”
Para. 3, which has been incorporated verbatim in the above quoted 
provision of the 1967 Treaty states that no state can appropriate outer 
space or the celestial bodies. The General Assembly approved the resolu­
tion on the 13th December, 1963, i.e. more than six years after the first 
artificial satellite had been launched. The resolution already reflected the 
unanimous posit ion the states adopted in respect of the legal st atus of outer 
space. The position of the states was expressed by their uniform attitude, 
i.e. by taking note without protest of the fact that artificial satellites 
launched by other states freely revolve in the region of the cosmic space 
above their territory without their previous consent. When the treaty 
bringing under regulation issues associated with the exploration and use of 
outer space, which with insignificant modifications incorporated the above 
quoted paragraphs of the resolution of the General Assembly of 1963, 
came to be submitted to the General Assembly, it was in like way unani­
mously approved on the 19th December, 1966.10 Therefore safely the state­
ment may be made that even as early as 1963 the case was not one of the 
adoption of a courtesy rule, but of the circumstance that the totality of the 
states recognized the advantages of the freedom of outer space for all, and 
that already at that time the opinio iuris required for the creation of a rule 
of customary law was firmly established. Yet even if doubts could emerge 
at that time, the adoption of resolution 2222 (XXI) of 1966 did away with 
them for good. I t was not until 1976 that opinions turned up which called 
into doubt the character of a res communis of outer space, which shows that 
the states agreed on the principles developed in respect of the legal status 
of the outer space.11
Hence the issue of the limits of state sovereignty does not emerge in 
a uniform manner in the outer space and on the sea. There were though 
certain provisions in the law of the sea from which conclusions could be 
drawn as to the maximum extension of the territorial waters, still this ex­
tension had not been brought under a uniform, unambiguous regulation. 
Moreover, hardly two years after the 1958 Law of the Sea Conference 
a new conference was convened solely for the establishment of the extension 
of the territorial waters, a circumstance which by itself indicates that the 
states do not regard the issue as settled. This was in particular evident 
after the unsuccessful termination of the conference. On the other hand 
as regards outer space we may speak on the strength of what has been 
set forth above of an established rule of customary law at least what con­
cerns the space beyond the perigee of the orbits described by the artificial 
satellites.
What conclusions may therefore be drawn from what has been set 
forth so far as to the question of the delimitation of outer space ? Legal
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thinking as a matter of course will be inclined to clear and hard and fast 
delimitations, which in general prove helpful when it comes to settle dis­
putes. Still in the given instance we have to admit that until of late it 
was of by far greater importance to define with exactitude the rules govern­
ing activities displayed in outer space rather than waste energy on the 
precise delimitation of air space and outer space. When, however, now it 
appears as if with regard to the rapid rate of technological progress the 
issue had to be considered in another manner, then we will not adopt this 
position merely because as regards the geostationary orbit actually in many 
respects indispensable for mankind certain states have appeared with 
claims to expropriating it. A change of the outlook has rather become 
necessary that the space shuttle now under test and in the near future 
probably to be put into operation in certain respects combines the prop­
erties of the spacecraft and aircraft and therefore it might become doubt­
ful what provisions of law are applicable to it. This on the other hand 
implies the risk that t he limits between air space and outer space established 
within the scope indicated before with more or less certainty and accuracy 
might become blurred. Consequently in fact a chaotic situation might 
arise. It was not, therefore, surprising when in the 17th session of the 
Legal Sub-Committee certain states which hitherto accepted the functional 
theory as satisfactory, regarded the delimitation of air space and outer 
space at a height of 100— 110 kilometres as justified. We are, of course, 
still far away from the formation of a consensus on this understanding! 
still the solution of the issue in the one way or other is in any case in a pro­
cess of maturation. In our opinion, however, even in the event of a de­
limitation of this kind, provision should also be made for granting the 
right of innocent passage to the states in the same wav as it has been 
granted in respect of the territorial waters, for launching their space objects 
through the air space of other states and also their return to the earth.
The delimitation of air space and outer space will at the same time 
settle the artificial dispute provoked by certain equatorial states in respect 
of the geostationary orbit. 1 his does not, however, mean as if in respect 
of the use of the geostationary orbit an international regulation could be 
dispensed with. Naturally such an orbit can accomodate a finite number of 
artificial satellites only. Though the geostationary orbit is still far from 
being fully occupied by the space objects placed on it, care should be 
taken in due time by the removal of non-operating artificial satellites to 
defer the state of saturation to as remote a date as possible and that the 
benefits afforded by the orbit should be available for all states.12
H: ÿ ^
There is yet another point of principle regarding outer space which 
still calls for regulation. This is the definition of the legal status of the 
Moon and possibly of other celestial bodies with greater accuracy. Here 
again there is a problem of the same kind as in the case of problems brought 
under regulation by the conventions already in force and referred to in the 
introductory section. The standard treaty of 1967 namely contains rules
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applicable to the Moon and other celestial bodies, when it, first, specially 
emphasizes that the provisions defined for the outer space are equally 
applicable to the Moon and other celestial bodies, and, secondly, establishes 
special rules for the latter, in particular as the freedom of entry on them 
and even more their demilitarization is concerned. The special regulation 
by a treaty may be justified insofar as it could expound or supplement the 
rules taken up in the standard treaty. This was the outlook of the draft 
treaty the government of the Soviet Union submitted to the General 
Assembly of the UN in The General Assembly, by Resolution 2779
(XXVI). passed on the draft to the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses 
of Outer Space for further study.
While the Soviet draft, inevitably, reiterates some of the provisions of 
the standard treaty it lays special stress on the application of the principle 
of international law declaring the prohibition of the use of force also to the 
Moon, the more because the standard treaty mentions in general terms only 
that space activities have to be performed in agreement with international 
law. The Soviet draft incorporates important provisions on the freedom of 
landing on the Moon and on that of exploratory work to be continued there, 
on making clear their necessary limits for safeguarding “the interests of 
present and future generations”.
We may reasonably suppose that the Soviet draft which usefully 
supplements the provisions of the 1967 Treaty, has met with the approval 
of the Space Committee without objections, and so also that of the General 
Assembly. However, to this day the consensus required for its approval 
is still wanting, and the draft has provoked passionate disputes in the 
committee. Actually the disputes are waged round a single fundamental 
issue, whose regulation has been intentionally omitted in the Soviet draft 
as premature, viz. the legal status of the natural resources of the Moon.
The silence of the Soviet draft on this issue appeared to be justified 
for the very reason that accurate data on such resources on the Moon are 
still wanting, although it is beyond dispute that natural resources are there 
too. A large-scale exploitation of these resources and their use on the Earth 
cannot, however, be expected in the near future. It cannot, therefore, be 
the function of international law to bring under regulation potential 
problems of the coming century several decades in beforehand, at a mo­
ment when a number of important and urgent questions could not be 
settled in the proper manner, not to mention the circumstance that the 
development of interstate relations cannot be foreseen for such distances 
in the temporal order.
A group of the developing countries would have the natural resources 
of the Moon qualified as the “common heritage of mankind”. Proposals 
on this understanding have already been submitted to the Legal Sub- 
Committee. The use of the term ‘heritage’ borrowed from civil law and in 
interstate relations of undefined meaning, not to speak of the qualification 
of mankind as a subject of international law, might provoke a certain 
astonishment, if we were not used to the application of the same term to the 
resources of the sea-bed and subsoil beyond the continental shelf so fre-
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quent in the skirmishes of the I llrd  conference on the law of the sea now 
going on for many years. There are. however, vast differences between 
the two areas for the very fact that whereas as regards the sea the ex­
ploitation of the natural resources from considerable depths is already 
within technological potentialities, the situation as regards the Moon is 
a wholly different one, not to mention the fact that our acquaintance 
with the sea-bed is a more thorough one than with the Moon where ex­
ploration is still in the initial phase.
For the purpose of regulation this is essential for the simple fact 
that when we wish to consider the natural resources of the Moon in a general 
way, without the concrete definition of the content of the term, the com­
mon heritage of mankind, or by translating this hazy expression into legal 
parlance of greater clarity, the undivided common property of all states, 
then by this we should obviously place serious obstacles in the way of the 
further exploration of the Moon. What as regards the seabed appears to 
be feasible without hampering progress in any appreciable measure, 
even when it does not help to clarify still moot questions, might for the 
time being amount to serious difficulties as far as the Moon is concerned. 
I t  is exactly for this reason that the proposal supported by a number of 
states that the elaboration of the legal regime of the exploitation of the 
natural resources of the Moon should take place at a time when such 
exploitation is technically feasible, appears to be justified. This position 
found expression in the Bulgarian draft of 1974 which already outlined 
some of the fundamental considerations to be observed at a future regula­
tion.13 Neither has this solution met with the approval of the developing 
countries represented in the Sub-Committee, so that agreement seems to 
be imaginable only in the one or the other form of a compromise. Since 
the developing countries absolutely insist on the incorporation of the term 
of ‘common heritage of mankind’ in the treaty, whereas other states 
would accept only a definition formulated in a more concrete manner, it 
is obvious that a compromise cannot be reached unless the term the 
developing countries suggest is accepted after its content has been for­
mulated with greater accuracy.
After protracted sterile disputes the 1978 session of the Legal Sub- 
Committee has taken this course and a new. complete draft, designated 
as the Austrian working paper, has been submitted.11 According to the 
passage incorporating the compromise text the Moon and its natural 
resources are for the purposes of this Agreement’ the common her tage 
■of mankind which ‘finds its expression in the relevant provisions of this 
Agreement’. This implies also that the international régime governing the 
exploitation of natural resources, hereincluded the appropriate procedures, 
should on the grounds of the above principle be worked out by a conference 
to be convened in the future, and this régime should then come into oper­
ation as soon as exploitation becomes feas ble. The draft, however, already 
at present provides that the international régime shall include the orderly 
and safe development of the natural resources of the Moon, the extens oil 
of their rational management, the expansion of opportunities in the r use
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and an equitable sharing by all states parties in the benefits derived, 
with special regard to the developing countries and to those states whose 
efforts have contributed to the exploration of the Moon.
The outlines of the principles here suggested are seemingly still some­
what indistinct, still this should be attributed to the merits of the draft rath­
er than to its shortcomings. This is the case because the practical applica­
tion of the provisions of the draft is a matter of the rather remote future 
when the exploitation of the natural resources of the Moon will technically 
and with due regard to considerations of economy become possible. Until 
then our acquaintance with the Moon will obviously become more thor­
ough. Incidentally no decision on the substance was born in the last session 
of the Sub-Committee, for although there was no declared opposition to 
the proposals brought forward in the draft not a single delegation was in 
the position for the time being to take a definitive stand within its own 
powers.
On the other hand, on the assumption of a settlement of the problem of 
natural resources it was not difficult to come to an agreement as regards 
the two still pending issues. Namely it was argued whether the provisions 
of the agreement originally relating to the Moon should in general extend 
to celestial bodies or should remain restricted to the Moon. The 1967 Treaty 
expressly mentions the Moon and other celestial bodies, i.e. its provi­
sions equally apply to celestial bodies in general. I t appears reasonable 
therefore, that the provisions to be laid down in the agreement on the 
Moon should equally extend to all celestial bodies. At the same time since 
our acquaintance with the other celestial bodies are in reality scanty the 
considerations set forth earlier will hold with even greater strength, so that 
a legal regulation going into details is in fact premature and for practical 
purposes at present meaningless. The new draft adopts the first outlook 
and extends its provisions to the Moon as well as to other celestial bodies 
of the solar system until for the one or the other of them no specific legal 
norms will come into force.15
The other still unsettled issue related to the content and the time of 
the information to be provided on missions launched for the exploration 
of the Moon and the results achieved in such exploration. Here mainly the 
standpoints of the states insisting on the preliminary information in con­
nexion with the launching of spacecraft and that of the states considering 
preliminary information needless clashed. Neither this question must be 
regarded as one of cardinal importance, and so the полу  draft, dependent on 
the approval of the regulation relating to the natural resources, provides 
for a solution appearing to be acceptable also as regards information. Ac­
cordingly the state launching the space object should as soon as possible 
inform the Secretary General of the UN, the public and the “international 
scientific community” of the data named in the draft, while information 
on the results achieved by the mission should be furnished after the com­
pletion of it.
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The scope of application of space technology tends to expand conti­
nually. Two spheres of issues, however, have taken shape where the urgent 
nature of the settlement is striking and which the Legal Sub-Committee 
has dealt with more or less success during the latter years. One of these 
spheres is that of telecommunications, the other that of remote sensing.
Telecommunication by means of artificial satellites has found practi­
cal application within a wide range and is even in the focal point of inter­
national organizations (Intersputnik, Intelsat, Inmarsat). Within the sphere 
of telecommunication, however, an extremely moot question awaits 
settlement with utmost urgency. It is that concerning direct television 
broadcasting.
By direct TV broadcasting service in the narrow sense such TV broad­
casts by means of artificial earth satellites are understood, which without 
the insertion of terrestrial relay stations reproduce TV picture and sound 
on domestic TV sets. The possible ways of a solution of the question have 
already been defined, and in the opinion of experts within a few years these 
may come to be translated into practice without expenses unbearable by 
individuals.
If the broadcasting state intends the direct TV broadcasts for a for­
eign state a number of problems will be apt to emerge which call for interna­
tional regulation. Some of the rules of international law already in operation 
may safely be applied to these direct TV broadcasts, still in'addition cer­
tain questions call for a new specific legal regulation.
During the latter few sessions the Legal Sub-Committee has already 
formulated nine tentative principles to govern the space activity here dis­
cussed, which may be considered definitive only after the drafting and 
approval of the entire set of principles. The nine already drafted principles 
expressly state that activities aimed at direct TV broadcasting can be pur­
sued only in complete agreement with the rules of international law. Spe­
cial stress has been laid on the United Nations Charter, on the 1967 Trea­
ty, the International Telecommunication Convention and its Regulations 
and on the international instruments relating to friendly relations and co­
operation among states and to human rights.18 This enumeration in addi­
tion to precisely defined rules of international law by referring to the Unit­
ed Nations Charter, further the Declaration on interstate relations and 
cooperation emphasizes the normative character of the principles of inter­
national law. Incidentally the principle of cooperation already turns up 
in the first principle the Sub-Committee has formulated. Among the ends 
of space activity in the form of direct TV broadcasting this principle in con­
junction with the maintenance of international peace and securitv makes 
ment ion of the development of cooperation between all states and peoples. 
Another principle points out that direct TV broadcasting by means of 
artificial satellites should be based upon international cooperation.
One of the nine principles so far formulated draws practical conse­
quences from the principle of cooperation when it states that if the direct 
TV broadcasting service of any state may have an effect on any other state,
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so upon request of the latter the transmitting state has to take up the 
matter with the other party in consultations.
Yet does this obligation of consultation suffice for the establishment 
of the thrice emphasized cooperation ? It would be hard to answer this ques­
tion in the affirmative when this specific partum de negotiando does not of 
necessity bring about an agreement between the parties to the dispute, so 
that in the given matter there cannot at all times be talk of cooperation. 
Yet television with its through space technology enormously extended 
range and so with an important role in the advancement of peace and the 
mutual understanding between states and peoples may owing to its propa­
ganda powers become a dangerous weapon in the competition between the 
states. In order to eliminate this contingency we may have to go beyond 
the obligation of consultations and make direct TV transmissions directed 
at another state dependent on an agreement between the states con­
cerned.
The issue has come up for discussion also in the Sub-Committee. No 
agreement has, however, been reached. The overwhelming majority of the 
Sub-Committee of 47 members has agreed that the consent of the terminal 
state should be required for the transmission. A few states have, however, 
on the plea of a free flow of information rejected this standpoint. The latter 
states have presented this principle as one recognized by international law 
and so have represented their standpoint as such being solely in agreement 
with the rules of international law.
Yet is there in reality such a generally recognized principle of interna­
tional law ? If we consider the practice followed by the states we have to 
come to the conclusion that never a state has recognized the unconditional 
right of another to forward information of whatever kind to its territory. 
Owing to the new means of mass communication born in the wake of tech­
nological development the problem has emerged in a novel form and has 
received increased importance. It was as early as the times of the League 
of Nations when sponsored by this organization a convention was signed in 
Geneva on the 23rd September, 1936, concerning the use of broadcasting 
in the cause of peace, aimed at the suppression of messages in radio 
broadcasts which were directed against the internal order or the safety of 
another country, included war propaganda or owing to inaccurate state­
ments endangered international concord.17
After the Second World War in the first session of the United Nations 
the question of the freedom of information was raised. Then and in follow­
ing sessions a few resolutions of the nature of recommendations came to 
be passed, which, of course, were void of binding force under international 
law. In 1948 under the auspices of UNO an international conference attend­
ed by a large number of states met in Geneva, whose function would have 
been to elaborate a convention on the freedom of information. Still the 
draft as formulated by the conference is still before the General Assembly, 
which on account of the clashes of opinions is unable to pass a resolution. 
A similar fate has been accorded to a draft declaration submitted by cer­
tain western states through ECOSOC in I960.18 Article 19 of the Uni-
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versai Declaration of Human Rights approved by the General Assembly 
in 1948 includes in art. 19 a provision according to which “Everybody 
has the right . . .  to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through 
any media and regardless of frontiers.” This in a generalized form formu­
lated thesis, which too has been laid down in a resolution of the General 
Assembly, cannot, however, be considered an instrument of internation­
al law of binding force notwithstanding the considerable moral weight 
attached to the Declaration.
On the other hand the covenants on human rights are of an altogether 
different nature. These already qualify as instruments of international 
law invested with binding force. Article 19 of the Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights states that the right of the freedom of expression implies 
t he freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas, of all kinds, 
regardless of frontiers. At the same time, however, the covenant immediate­
ly declares that the exercise of these rights is associated with special duties 
and responsibilities. Consequently these rights may be made subject to 
certain restrictions, among others in the interest of national security, pub­
lic order, public health or morals. In other words this means that the states 
without hampering the enforcement of the given rights can in their munici­
pal legislat ion set up limits to the exercise of the right of expression.
Roth the propagation of information and the rightful setting up of 
limits to it cannot be effective, however, unless the states concerned agree 
on some sort of cooperation in both respects. The want of cooperation im­
plies the risk that the states might exploit direct TV broadcasting for pro­
paganda as well as counter-propaganda, or possibly have recourse to such 
measures as are aimed at the prevention of broadcasts transgressing the 
limits set up by them, or prevent them from being received. It is obvious 
that measures of this kind might be prejudicial to the peaceful coexistence 
of the different states.
Cooperation aiming the elimination of these risks means the agreement 
of the states on direct television broadcasts. This cooperation may imply 
the acceptance of the principle that for direct TV broadcasts the agree­
ment of the receiving state should be required, as laid down in the drafts 
on the one part the Soviet Union19 and on the other, Canada and Sweden20 
submitted to the Legal Sub-Committee. Both instruments clearly state 
that direct television broadcasting by means of artificial satellites directed 
to another state cannot take place unless by consent of this state. The same 
principle has been laid down in the Argentinian draft, which demands the 
prior consent of the state concerned and expressly precludes even the chance 
of a tacit agreement 21 Nor does the draft substantially depart from these 
which the working group set up by the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space at its 1977 Vienna session in the course of the discussion of 
the Legal Sub-Committee's report, has put forward. This draft requires 
the consultation and the agreement of the states concerned for direct te­
levision broadcasts.
The agreement of the states would, however, be imaginable even in a 
more general form, if the agreement defined the contents of the broadcasts
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or described in detail the kinds of broadcasts which should be regarded as 
prohibited. A definition of tins kind has been taken up in the Soviet draft, 
yet in combination with the principle of express consent. The question re­
mains, however, to be answered whether a general definition of the content 
of the broadcasts would in the event of the elimination of the concrete con­
sent of the receiving state suffice for the safeguard of the interests of that 
state. What may be accepted as certain is that this definition of the content 
of the broadcasts might give occasion for innumerable frictions between 
states and therefore in any event provisions have to be made for the appro­
priate means of settlement of disputes likely to arise.
The settlement of the problem of direct TV broadcasts has to some 
extent been facilitated by the agreements laid down in the Final Acts 
of the World Administrative Radio Conference sponsored by the Inter­
national Telecommunication Union and held in Geneva in the beginning 
of 1977. Since the broadcasts in question can take place only by means of 
artificial satellites placed on the geostationary orbit, whose number is, 
as has been mentioned, limited, and s:nce for technical reasons not to be 
detailed here actually only the 12-GHz frequency band can be exploited 
for the purpose of direct broadcasting, except for the American continent 
the agreements distribute the frequency bands and orbital positions to be 
used bv the states concerned. In general owing to their width the particular 
bands are suitable only for comprising the territory of the given state. 
This also implies that for states of large geographical dimensions several 
orbital positions have to be earmarked, from which then by exploiting 
the specified frequency band the various regions of the state could be 
beamed.22 This means that on the grounds of the agreements arrived at 
direct broadcasts can provide only the territory of the country concerned, 
which of course does not guarantee the elimination of spill-overs to the 
frontier regions of adjacent countries. Broadcasts directed to beyond the 
frontier cannot, however, take place.
Hence the situation has undoubtedly changed since the agreements 
referred to had been enacted. Still we cannot by far state that the anxieties 
of the states which demand the consent of the receiving state for direct 
TV broadcasts had become wholly unfounded. Apart from the fact that 
the agreements coming into operation as from the 1st January, 1979 have 
been signed for a term of fifteen years, certain doubts are apt to arise 
because these agreements tried to settle issues of a political nature with 
purely technical rules. The violation of international rules of a technical 
nature is judged by international public opinion in general with greater 
lenience than would that of provisions of greater political importance. 
From this the conclusion may be drawn that some sort of a harmony 
should be brought about between the method of settlement and the char­
acter of the issue. It is, therefore, rightful that a large number of states 
bring forward their claim to have the issue in question of a political weight 
settled by provisions of international law of even weight. At the same time 
we have to recognize, however, that the adoption of the Final Acts of 
1977 has removed much of the difficulties in the way of settlement and
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there is reasonable hope that if for the time being not by a treaty or con­
vention still at least by the taking up certain general principles in a re­
solution of the General Assembly the conduct may be defined the com­
munity of nations expects from the particular states in connexion with 
direct TV broadcasting by means of artificial satellites.
*  *  *
Finally among the most t imely questions awaiting regulation mention 
has to be made of the problems relating to remote sensing from outer 
space. I t is commonly known that from the cosmic space terrestrial pheno­
mena may be observed which defy observation from the Earth or the air 
space. This remote sensing is of utmost importance for purposes of environ­
mental protection, the prevention of natural disasters, the improvement 
of meteorological prognostications, the improvement of the reliability of 
crop estimates, etc. Of particular practical significance is remote sensing 
of the earth from the cosmic space for the discovery of the places of oc­
currence of mineral resources. The data transmitted from outer space 
together with terrestrial data provide useful information of the places of 
occurrence of those resources.
Naturally remote sensing performed by a state in respect of its own 
territory does not call for regulation under international law. The situation 
will become an altogether different one, when an artificial satellite launched 
into space by a state performs remote sensing above the territory of another 
state. The first question that has to be answered is whether in c onformitv 
with international law remote sensing directed by the one state to the 
territory of another is permitted. It would be useless to look for an un­
ambiguous answer to this question in the Space Treaty. Article I of the 
Treaty merely states that ‘Outer space... shall be free for exploration and 
use by all States without discrimination of any kind’. Article III  lays 
down that ‘States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the 
exploration and use of outer space . . .  in accordance with international 
law , and specially emphasizes that this has to be done in agreement 
with the Charter of the United Nations.
Strictly speaking from the provisions here quoted it only follows 
that the exploration and use of outer space are free for anv country. Still 
this does not want to say that outer space is free also for such earth- 
directed activities which are not in agreement with the rules of international 
law. Accordingly the conclusion suggests itself that since every state may 
within its own sövere'gntv define the data which it wants to disclose or to 
keep secret in respect of its territory, any remote sensing activity by 
another state in respect of this territory against the will of the state*con­
cerned is barred as interference into the sphere of the domestic jurisdiction 
of the state.
At the same time it has to be remembered, however, that in this 
respect a rule of customary law to the contrary is in statu nascendi, moreover 
it may justly be assumed that this rule has since become established. 
Remote sensing is namely in progress on the part of the states which are
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in possession of the appropriate technological means. The states are fully 
acquainted with this activity, however, so far scarcely any protests have 
been sounded against it. We may, therefore, make the statement that 
the states have tacitly agreed to remote sensing activities, moreover they 
have tried to obtain the data other countries gained through their activities 
of their territory merely in order to exploit these for their own purposes.2:1
By this we do not want to state as if in the UN Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and its two sub-committees certain developing 
countries had not, on the plea of their sovereignty, objected to remote 
sensing without their previous consent. At the same time, however, to 
our knowledge concrete protests on an interstate level have been made 
sporadically only. From this the conclusion may be drawn that the states 
in general have considered and are considering the manifold use of remote 
xens'ng something in the interest of the community of nations. At the 
same time it cannot be called into doubt that the tying of remote sensing 
to a preliminary agreement might hamper this activity which among 
others also serves the prevention of great natural disasters or at least 
the mitigation of their effects. In addition considerable technological 
difficulties might have to be overcome in the event of an adjustment of 
the operation of the equipment of remote sensing satellites, or their switch­
ing on and off, to the frontiers of the particular states. Nor can it be 
doubted that the prohibition of remote sensing would call for the adoption 
of a legal norm whose respect could not be controlled by the technological 
means now available. The enactment of such a norm would hardly serve 
the peaceful coexistence of the states, and is rather apt to introduce disturb­
ing effects into the international relations.
A point which may and even ought to be settled bv a provision of 
international law is the use to be made of t he data obtained through remote 
sensing. Here two opinions are conflicting. According to the one, mainly 
advocated by the United States, the data should be made accessible to all 
irrespective of whether the party interested in them is a state, physical 
or juristic person. Obviously the accessibility of the data without limitations 
would enable the large multinational companies to come into the posses­
sion of data in the knowledge of which they might acquire a beneficial 
position much to the prejudice of the territorial state.
On the other hand the holders of the opposing opinion would have 
the transmission of the data restricted and made dependent on the agree­
ment of the territorial state. A provision of this kind has been taken up 
in the joint Soviet —French working paper24, and the Brazilian proposal25.
In our opinion such a restriction is justified in so far as it applies to 
the transmission of data to physical and juristic persons. Still one would 
be hard put to it to find conclusive reasons for the exclusion of the access 
of the one or the other state to the data when it has been recognized that 
all states qualify for remote sensing. On the other hand the declaration 
of the principle taken up in the French—Soviet document appears to be 
absolutelv proper, namely the declaration that the data obtained from 
the territory of the state serving as the object of remote sensing should
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on mutually agreed terms be made accessible to that state, and also the 
provision of the tentative text elaborated, but still under discussion in the 
Sub-Committee which recognizes priority to the sensed state in the access 
to these data.20
If we set out from the understanding t hat no consent is required from 
the territorially affected state for the performance of remote sensing, and 
in particular if we recognize that the sensing state can pass on the data 
or information so obtained also toother states, the issue of the exploitation 
of the data or information will necessarily emerge, a circumstance which 
might gravely affect the sensed state. In its 1977 session the Legal Sub- 
Committee tentatively formulated its Principle No. VIII which with 
reference among others to the principle that at remote sensing, too, atten­
tion should be given to the rules of international law, correctly stated that 
the states were not entitled to the use of information so obtained to the 
detriment of the legitimate rights and interests of other states. The thesis 
is, obviously, self-explanatory and also follows from the universally ac­
cepted principles of international law. Still we have to agree in every 
respect to its express stipulation. The same applies also to the provision 
incorporated in Principle X according to which the states bear interna­
tional responsibility for the remote sensing activities they carry out.27
On the other hand the less is the stubborn resistance understandable 
which was put up against the fixation of the principle which the socialist 
and developing countries brought forward. Most of the western countries 
represented in the Sub-Committee namely raised protests against the 
thesis that in the process of remote sensing of the natural resources of the 
Earth the full and permanent sovereignty of states and peoples over 
their natural resources should be respected. This principle has been given 
expression already in Resolution No. 62(5 (VII) of the UN General 
Assembly in 1952. Since that the principle has been reiterated in General 
Assembly resolutions on several occasions, moreover it has been incorporat­
ed in both covenants of human rights with binding force, as Article 1, 
according to which every people may dispose freely of its natural wealth 
and resources. The representatives of the western states rejected the 
proposal which wanted to insert the sovereignty over natural resources in 
the principles to be applied to remote sensing on the plea that remote 
sensing could not affect this sovereignty. Still if in a large number of cases 
it is exactly the purpose of remote sensing to explore data relating to the 
natural resources in the soil of another state and to pass on these data to 
other states, then it can justly lie feared lest information so acquired 
should be used in a way in fact impairing the sovereignty of the territorial 
state in respect of its natural resources. For this reason it appears to bo 
-wholly justified to insert the principle in question in the series of the prin­
ciples governing remote sensing, something which could so far take place 
conditionally only, since the necessary consensus could not yet been 
achieved.
* * *
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In the foregoing discussion we have briefly outlined the most urgent 
practical problems awaiting settlement, problems namely which have 
emerged in connexion with the peaceful exploration and use of outer 
space. We may reasonably reckon with the emergence of a whole series of 
further problems of which one of the most important will undoubtedly 
come up in connection with the exploitation of solar energy. All this 
convincingly proves that technological progress makes its effects strongly 
felt also in international law, and insists that the scholars of international 
law use their body of knowledge for the solution of problems apt to arise 
at growing frequency.
NOTES
1 As is known no clear-cut provisions concerning the extension o f the territorial waters 
have been taken  up  in the 1958 Geneva Convention, since none of the proposals has received 
th e  required two th irds m ajority . Still from  article 7 defining the notion of a bay and Article 
24 on the contiguous zone by  inference the conclusion m ay be draw n th a t  the Convention 
did n o t intend to recognize territo ria l w aters o f a w idth in excess o f twelve miles.
2 See th e  documents Nos. 331, 319, 249, 165, 121, 281, 237, 223 and 229 o f the Confer­
ence. The standpoint considering the geostationary o rb it the na tu ra l resource of the sta te  
beneath it has been emphasized m ost strongly  by the Ecuadorian docum ent (No. 229).
3 See docum ent No. 266 o f  the Conference
4 See document No. 326
5 In  particu lar see th e  sta tem ents o f the Colombian observer and the delegate of K enya 
(U. N. Doc. A/AC. 105/C. 2/SR 277 and Л /AC. 10S/C. 2/SR. 280)
6 Brazil, Ecuador, Indonesia, K enya, Colombia, Congo, U ganda and  Zaire.
' In  his address to th e  1977 session of the Legal Sub-Committee R . E . Butler, Deputy 
Secretary-General o f the In ternational Telecommunication Union regarded a height of 130 
kilom etres as justified.
8 A non-official d ra f t resolution subm itted to the 1978 session of the Legal Sub-Com­
m ittee correctly sta ted  th a t the geostationary orbit was inseparable from outer space and 
th a t all provisions o f the 1967 tre a ty  on the exploration and uso o f outer space were appli­
cable also to this orbit, fu rther th a t the placing of an artificial satellite on the geostationary 
orbit did no t create righ t o f ow nership as to  the o rb ita l positions so occupied or certain  
sections o f the orbit.
9 I . C. J . R eports 1969, p. 38.
10 See Resolution 2222 (X X I) o f the General Assembly
11 H anna B o k o r - Szegô in her w ork Az ENSZ helye a nemzetkozi jogalkotâsban (Tire 
place of the U nited N ations in international legislation( (Budapest, 1976) also m aintains the 
opinion, though w ithout giving reasons lo r it, th a t the rules associated with cosmic space 
had the force o f rules o f custom ary law  already before the adoption of th e  declaration 
b y  the General Assembly and th a t these rules had merely been developed b y  th e  declara­
tion  (p. 71).
12 The question how m any artific ia l satellites m ay be placed on the geostationary or­
b it w ithout the risk o f collision or ol the m utual interference w ith their activities cannot bo 
answered in a general form. The num ber of satellites depends to  a considerable ex ten t on the 
purpose for which these satellites have been launched into space. I n  1977 about one hundred 
space objects were revolving on the geostationary orbit, and for the com ing years the launch­
ing of about 15 to  20 satellites has been foreseen. Of the about hundred artificial satellites 
several are no more operativo. The artificial satellites approaching the end of their lifetime 
m ay be steered clear o f th is orbit by  using the last reserves o f their fuel. (On details see the 
study No. A/AC. 105/203 o f  the Secretariat o f  the United Nations.)
13 Doc. A/AC. 105/C. 2/L. 93
11 See Doc. VVG. I  (1978) VVP. 2. The working paper received the designation ’A ustrian’ 
because the A ustrian delegation collected th e  passages approved in the foregoing years and
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the  solution inking shape us to th e  n a tu ra l resources of the Moon in genesis and consolidated 
all these in a single uniform d ra ft a fte r th e  necessary small corrections had been inserted.
15 I t  would be ridiculous to  enlarge on the occasionally emerging ’problem ’ w hether a
regulation should be brought about “only” in respect o f the celestial bodies o f the solar sys­
tem  or should such a  regulation be extended to  celestial bodies beyond the solar system The 
space tre a ty  speaks o f celestial bodies in general term s only. The d ra f t tries to  specify its 
scope and therefore expressly extends its valid ity  to  celestial bodies w ithin the solar system  
and expressly exem pts the E arth  from under its  operation. Any trea tm en t o f celestial bodies 
outside the solar system a t  present has its justification only in sci-fi literature. The exem p­
tion  o f the E arth  from under th e  operation o f the trea ty  is wholly justified, as the planet on 
which we are living cannot for the purpose of legal regulation be treated  in the same w ay as 
o ther celestial bodies. J
16 Doc. A/AC. 105/171 A nnex II , p. 2
17 League of N ations T reaty Series, vol. CLX X XV I, 1938, p. 301 The convention was 
p u t into operation in  1938, still m any of the signatories did not ratify  it, so am ong others the 
Soviet Union. H ungary  is not p arty  to the convention.
18 For details o f the fate o f the d ra f t convention and d ra f t declaration see Kolosov 
Y. M.: Massovaya infonnatsiya i mezhdunarodnoe pravo (Mass inform ation and in ternatio­
nal law) Moscow, 1974, pp. 117 e t seq.
19 See A/AC. 106/WG. 3(V)/CRP. 1
20 See A/AC. 106/WG. 3/L. 4
21 See A/AC. 105/WG. 3(V)/CRP. 3
22 Exceptions are certain  groups of states (Scandinavian states, certain  Arab states) 
which by agreem ent o f the sta tes forming the group have been accorded wider facilities o f 
beam ing, so th a t international broadcasts are feasible w ithin th is group.
23 The Soviet U nion makes these da ta  available upon request to  the territorially  con­
cerned states. On the o ther hand the U nited States places these da ta  a t the disposal o f 
anybody. 1
21' a /AC. 106/C. 2./L. 99
25 A/AC. 106/122
28 In  conform ity w ith one o f the principles the Sub-Committee has elaborated the da ta  
th a t  have to  be placed a t  disposal “ timely”, and in any case no la te r th an  to  anv o ther th ird  
state.
27 In  the R eport o f the 1978 session the principles referred to  above have been given 
serial num bers by one higher. The reason is th a t the Sub-Committee has inserted a  fu rther 
principle containing the definition of the te im s incorporated in the principles a t  the begin­
ning o f the wording, giving it the serial num ber I.
ÜBER EINIGE AKTUELLE FRAGEN DES WELTRAUMRECHTS
(RESUME)
Die rapide Entw icklung und die bereits in die Wege geleitete praktische A nwendung 
der W eltraumtechnologie b ring t die Notwendigkeit der rechtlichen Regelung der bis je tz t 
ungelösten allgemeinen Probleme des W eltraum s m it sich. Zugleich wird auch die D ringlich­
keit einer entsprechenden Regelung der konkreten praktischen Anwendungsmethoden der 
Raum technologie offensichtlich.
Zwei der allgemeinen Probleme liegen bereits seit mehreren Jah ren  vor dem R echtsun­
terausschuss für W elt raum fragen der UNO, und zw ar die A bgrenzung von W eltraum  und  
L uftraum , sowie die Festsetzung des R echtsstatus des Mondes. Das schwierige Problem der 
Abgrenzung konnte bis je tz t dadurch umgangen werden, dass die S taaten  ihre Bemühungen 
auf die Schaffung von Rechtsnormen konzentrierten, die die Regelung der im W eltraum  en t­
falteten Tätigkeiten bezweckten. Die -  vom rechtlichen Gesichtspunkte zw ar unbegründe­
ten  -  Ansprüche der A quatorialstaaten au f die geostationäre E rdum laufbahn haben jedoch 
die Aufmerksamkeit wieder au f die Abgrenzungsfrage gelenkt. E s ist aber vorwiegend der 
voraussichtlich bald erfolgenden Inbetriebsetzung des „space-shuttle“ zuzuschreiben, dass 
auch diejenigen, die sich vor einer eingehenden Besprechung des Abgrenzungsproblems 
bisher verschlossen hatten , ihren S tandpunk t je tz t sorgfältig überprüfen.
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Hinsichtlich des R eehtsstatus des Mondes soll erw ähnt werden, dass der entsprechende 
V ertragsentw urf bereits vor längerer Zeit durchberaten wurde, die allgemeine Zustimmung 
der M itgliedstaaten des R echtsunterausschusses wird jedoch durch die Meinungsverschieden­
heiten über die Frage der A usbeutung der natürlichen Ressourcen des Mondes behindert, 
eine Frage also, die erst in einer fernen Z ukunft ak tuell werden dürfte. Die Entwicklungs­
länder fordern die A ufnahm e einer B estim m ung, wonach der Mond und seine Ressourcen 
..das gemeinsame Erbe der Menscheit“ bilden. Dies wäre aber für andere S taaten  nur dann 
annehm bar, wenn der genaue Inha lt dieses verschwommenen liegt ills in räsonnabler Weise 
gek lärt würde.
Von den Fragen, die mit der praktischen Anwendung der Raumtechnologie Zusammen­
hängen, befassen sich die l'X O -O rgane bereits seit einiger Zeit m it den Problemen des direk­
ten Satellitenfernsehens, sowie der Fernbeobachtung der Erde.
Bei dem ersten Problem gerät die staatliche Souverenität in Zusammenstoss m it dem 
durch einige verfochtenen P rinzip des sog. „freien Ström ens der In form ation“. Eine Lösung 
des Problem s is t n u r aufgrund der A chtung der Souverenität vorstellbar, was am  besten 
durch die vorherige Zustim m ung des Em pfängerstaates zur Fernsehsendung gesichert wer­
den könnte. Auch das zweite Problem berührt die staatliche Souverenität, da die Fernbeo­
bach tung  vor allem — obwohl keineswegs ausschliesslich — au f die E rkundung von Lager­
s tä tten  der Bodenschätze gerichtet ist. Obzwar auch in diesem Falle die Erforderlichkeit 
der Zustim m ung des beobachteten S taates begründet werden könnte, muss es doch lest g e ­
stellt werden, dass eine gewohnheitsrechtliche Regel im Entstehen begriffen ist, die die freie 
A usübung der Fernbeobachtung anerkennt. Dabei scheint es aber unbedingt nötig, R echts­
norm en zu schaffen, die die Regelung der Verwendung der erm ittelten Inform ationen zum 
Zwecke hätten .
E s muss auch dam it gerechnet werden, dass in einer nicht allzu fernen Zukunft weitete 
Rechtsprobleme, die durch die praktische Anwendung der W eltraumtechnologie entstehen, 
gelöst werden müssen. Eines der w ichtigsten dieser Probleme wird sieh voraussichtlich aus 
der N utzung der Sonnenenergie ergeben.
О НЕКОТОРЫХ АКТУАЛЬНЫХ ПРОБЛЕМАХ МЕЖДУНАРОДНОГО 
КОСМИЧЕСКОГО ПРАВА
Д-р ДЕРДЬ ХАРАСТИ 
профессор
(Резюме)
Бурное развитие космической техники и начало практического применения ее 
с одной стороны выдвигает необходимость юридического регулирования общих еще 
нерегулированных проблем космического пространства, с другой стороны делает 
обоснованной неотложность юридического регулирования конкретных практических 
способов применения техники.
Из вопросов общего характера два уже несколько .чет стоят перед подкомитетом 
по космическому праву ООН, а именно отграничение космоса от воздушного прост­
ранства, а также определение правового статуса Л уны . Трудную проблему отграни­
чения до сих пор можно было обойти благодаря тому, что государства направляли 
свои усилия между на родного правотворчества скорее на регулирование деятель­
ности в области космического пространства, однако юридически необоснованные 
требования, связанные с геостационарной орбитой, выдвинутые странами, находя­
щимися на экваторе, снова привлекли внимание на вопрос отграничения. Но скорее 
ближайшее введение в эксплуатацию space-shuttle является фактором, который 
принуждает и те государства тщательно пересмотреть своп взгляды, которые до 
сих пор решительно отклонялись от серьезного обсуждения проблемы отграни­
чения. Проект международного соглашения, преследующий регулирование статуса 
Л уны, который в случае принятия полезно дополнял бы распоряжения договора о 
мировом пространстве 1967 г., уже практически давно готов, и окончательному его
5 4  G Y . H A R A S Z T I
одобрению мешают разногласия u вопросе эксплуатации природных ресурсов Л уны, 
которая в далеком будущем станут актуальной. Требование развивающихся стран, 
по которому Луна и ее природные ресурсы составляют «общее наследство челове­
чества» может быть принято другими государствами только в том случае, если ра­
зумно вудет определено точное содержание этого туманного понятия.
В связи с практическим применением космической техники, из вопросов, ожи­
даемых регулирования, органы ООН уже определенное время занимаются ком­
плексом вопросов непосредственного телевизионного вещания и дистанционного 
зондирования, проводимого из космоса. Что касается первого круга проблем суве­
ренитет государства противоречит так называемому «принципу свободного потока 
информаций», установленному некоторыми государствами. Решение можно найти 
только в случае уважения суверенитета государств, что обеспечило бы предваритель­
ное согласие на телевизионное вещание государства, на территорию которого на­
правляется телевизионное вещснпс. И другой круг проблем затрагивает вопрос 
суверенитета госадурства, т. к. дистанционное зондирование из космоса ставит себе 
целью, хотяп не исключительно, но в первую очередь распознание местонахожде­
ния природных богатев земли. Хотя и здесь была бы обоснованной необходимость 
предварительного согласия заинтересованного государтва, все-таки следует устано­
вить, что формируется правило обычного права, признающее свободу дистанционного 
зондирования. При этом однако считается безусловно регулируемым вопрос приме­
нения информаций, полученных путем дистанционного зондирования земли.
В скором будущем, в связи с практическим применением космической техники, 
ожидается постановление все более новых проблем, из которых одна из самых важых 
будет связана, но всей вероятности, с применением солнечной энергии.
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